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Joost Pauwelyn has written an extensive and thought-provoking treatise on the interaction 
of norms in public international law (PIL), in particular between norms of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and non-WTO norms, through a conceptual lens of “conflict.”1 His 
main argument is non-WTO norms should be able to “trump” WTO norms under certain 
circumstances. After framing the concept of norm conflict in PIL (Chapter 1), and 
defining the nature of WTO law (“reciprocal” obligations) vis-à-vis that of other branches 
of PIL such as human rights and international environmental law (“integral” obligations) 
(Chapter 2), the book unfolds its conflict thesis, including hierarchy of sources (Chapter 
3), two mutually exclusive modes of norm interaction, which are accumulation and 
conflict (Chapter 4), conflict avoidance (Chapter 5), and conflict resolution (Chapters 6 
and 7). The final Chapter attempt to apply the conflict thesis developed in previous 
Chapters to the specific situation of WTO dispute settlement. This review will chiefly 
focus on the nature, or identity, of the WTO as it is described and defined by Pauwelyn 
when he addresses the norm conflict between WTO rules and non-WTO rules. In this 
treatise, WTO’s identity is dealt with in two ways: first, in relations to public 
international law (external identity); second, within itself or among its Members (internal 
identity). Importantly, Pauwelyn’s position on these two facets of WTO’s identity is 




I. Conflict Thesis 
 
Pauwelyn adopts a broad concept of conflict which contrasts with a traditional view 
(narrow concept) envisioned by Wilfred Jenks and Wolfram Karl, i.e., a collision of 
mutually exclusive obligations in two norms.2 Therefore, non-conflict interactions 
between/among different norms under the narrow view may nonetheless fall within the 
rubric of conflict in this book.3 In a sense, conflict is a conceptual tool with which 
Pauwelyn examines an interrelation or interaction of different norms of public 
                                                 
1 JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO 
OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003, Cambridge University Press) [hereinafter CONFLICT OF 
NORMS]. 
2 Id., at 169-70. 
3 Id., at 184-88 (conflict scenarios 2-4). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=988775
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international law. In response to this broad scope of conflict, he introduces 
comprehensive conflict-avoidance techniques4 as well as its resolutions.5 In sum, he 
captures a broad range of problems and also offers a broad range answers.  
 
Pauwelyn begins his analysis by configuring a universe of PIL, especially in relation to 
the law of WTO. He views the WTO law as a mere “branch”6 or a “sub-system”7 of PIL. 
As a branch or a sub-system, the WTO does, or must, interact with other braches or sub-
systems of PIL, such as human rights treaties (HR) and international environmental 
agreements (IE). The WTO is neither a “closed legal circuit” nor a “self-contained” 
regime.8 Non-WTO norms residing in a broader terrain of PIL should be able to “prevail” 
over WTO norms in various situations of conflict.9 What facilitates non-WTO norms’ 
prevalence over or penetration into WTO norms is Pauwelyn’s unique position on the 
nature of WTO rights and obligations. Based on his rather unsophisticated observation 
that “trade is and remains a bilateral happening,”10 he concludes that the nature of WTO 
norms is “bilateral/reciprocal” in accordance with its goal to ensure bilateral market 
access, despite a collective effect of trade.11 Therefore, as a legal system the WTO is 
distinguishable from other branches of PIL such as HR and IE whose rights and 
obligations are “integral” in that they pursue “collective/universal” values or “global 
commons.”12 Finally, he views that: 
 
A breach of WTO trade rules may affect a number of members individually, but it 
does not amount to an offense of the collective right or conscience of all state 
parties, the way that a human rights breach does.13 
 
A corollary of this bilateralism/reciprocalism can be found in a somewhat oxymoronic 
thesis of the “legality of inter se agreements deviating from the WTO treaty.”14 
Obviously, what deviates from the WTO treaty is a violation, once and for all, unless the 
WTO treaty is amended to accommodate such deviation. However, in order to “tolerate” 
such agreements within the WTO in conflict situations, Pauwelyn invents a new concept 
of “inter se modifications” by which certain WTO Members dispose of or privatize the 
rule of WTO law by carving out or suspending certain WTO provisions among/between 
themselves. Again, this privatized suspension of WTO norms is only possible because 
Pauwelyn deems WTO obligations bilateral/reciprocal. For example, under such a 
modification the U.S. can ban imports from Mexico despite GATT Article XI once the 
two have passed whatever treaty between themselves which mandates or authorizes such 
trade restriction. In sum, these modifications are a representative form of resolving 
                                                 
4 Id., ch. 5. 
5 Id., chs. 6-7. 
6Id., at 25-26. 
7 Id.,at 9. 
8 Id.,at 35. 
9 Id.,at 316. 
10 Id.,at 71 (emphasis added). 
11 Id.,at 72. 
12 Id.,at 72-73. 
13 Id.,at 72 (emphasis original). 
14 Id.,at 315. 
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II. Critique of Premises  
 
As discussed above, Pauwelyn predicates his thesis largely on the “bilateral/reciprocal” 
nature of WTO norms which, at least to him, originates from a material aspect of 
international trade (bilateral happening) as well as its goal (bilateral market access). This 
rather inferior legal status of the WTO vis-à-vis other braches of PIL, such as HR and IE, 
which enjoy “integral” nature of rights and obligations as they pursue universal goals, is 
naturally prone to inter-branch conflicts which Pauwelyn envisions. It also tends to 
justify the penetration of these lofty norms into the humble law of WTO. However, these 
fundamental premises that Pauwelyn employs are hard to accept. 
 
First of all, Pauwelyn’s simplistic diagram of international trade suffers anachronism. 
Trade as a bilateral happening might have gathered certain currencies in the era of a 
Treaty on Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation in the nineteenth century, or even in 
the earlier days of the old GATT consisting of “contracting” parties. However, the WTO 
as it stands today is a full-blown “multilateral” trading system in which not only 
Members but also individual economic players retain their own stakes for its stability and 
predictability, as the Section 301 panel eloquently portrayed.15 Moreover, Pauwelyn 
argues that “trade and the liberalization of trade is not a value” unlike the protection of 
human rights or the environment.16 Here, Pauwelyn is oblivious of the solemn historical 
fact that the very genesis of GATT was attributed to tragic economic balkanization in the 
interwar period which precipitated the Second World War.17 If we agree that the 
prevention of war serves the protection and promotion of human rights, trade 
liberalization itself may claim its own value. Likewise, an “integrated, more viable, and 
durable” multilateral trading system18 itself is a “global commons.” If one accepts 
arguendo Pauwelyn’s premise that trade only realizes a “compilation of individual 
welfare increases,”19 wouldn’t such a compilation itself, if global, be sufficient to entitle 
WTO norms as being collective and universal?  
 
Unlike what Pauwelyn observes,20 rules of origin serve no confirmation of bilateral 
nature of WTO obligations. Rules of origin attest an imperfectness of the multilateral 
                                                 
15 “7.76 The security and predictability in question are of "the multilateral trading system." The multilateral 
trading system is, per force, composed not only of States but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic 
operators. The lack of security and predictability affects mostly these individual operators.” WTO Panel 
Report on United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Jan. 27, 2000). 
16 Id.,at 73. 
17 See Dennis Kennedy, Regional Trading Blocs, Multilateralism and the New GATT Agreement: An 
Introduction, in REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS, MULTILATERALISM, AND THE GATT: COMPLEMENTARY PATHS 
TO FREE TRADE 1 (Till Geiger & Dennis Kennedy eds., 1996); Patricia Clavin, The Triumph of Regionalism 
over Globalism: Patterns of Trade in the Interwar Period, in COMPLEMENTARY PATHS, supra, at 31-33. 
18 Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl. 
19 CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 1, at 78. 
20 Id., at 71, n. 144. 
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trading system at the current stage. A main function of rules of origin is to single out 
specific countries to either advantage or disadvantage them vis-à-vis the rest of WTO 
Members.21 In other words, trading nations need rules of origin when they extend 
preferential tariffs to a selected group of trading partners or impose antidumping duties 
on products from them. Yet, the underlying rationale of rules of origin derives from 
exceptions (in case of regional trading blocs) or abnormalities (in case of antidumping) of 
general trade rules, i.e., non-discrimination. Note that either the U.S. or the European 
Union (EU) does not need rules of origin in its internal trade. If the world becomes one 
big customs union through perfect trade liberalization, we would no longer need rules of 
origin. In other words, rules of origin do not concern the nature of WTO obligations but 
is a mere manifestation of imperfect trading system as of now. This observation gains 
strength when considering the “spaghetti bowl” phenomenon of rules of origin in regional 
trading blocs which plagues the current multilateral trading system.22  
 
Pauwelyn also assigns bilateral aspects of WTO retaliation (countermeasures) to a 
bilateral nature of WTO obligations.23 Yet, a bilateral nature of retaliation does not 
necessarily reflect a bilateral nature of WTO obligations, but merely a remedial 
consequence of adversarial adjudication. Even if the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
adjudicates a case on human rights violation between two parties, countermeasures as a 
remedy cannot but help being bilateral at the end. Furthermore, retaliation is far from 
being an ideal form of remedy. It may be self-inflicting in that it hurts consumers of 
retaliating country and also ineffective in that rich countries are hardly affected by poor 
countries’ retaliation.24 As the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
emphasizes in many provisions, a withdrawal of violation should be a primary mode of 
remedy.25 After all, this is what a panel or the Appellate Body recommends in its 
decision, i.e., to bring the violative measure into conformity to the WTO obligations. 
 
Turning to the titular “integral” obligations in HR or IE, they are not always so. Devilish 
details of HR or IE would reveal the fact that not every item in the list of human rights 
deserves the crown of erga omnes. Most human rights treaties have limited number of 
signatories. In fact, more items in that list are controversial in their ontology than others 
which receive a wide consensus and approval.26 Likewise, a number of human rights 
                                                 
21 See Moshe Hirsch, Rules of Origin as Trade or Foreign Policy Instruments?: The European Union 
Policy on Products Manufactured in the Settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 26 FORDHAM 
INT'L L.J. 572, 574-76 (2003). See also Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational 
Economy: Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 401, 410 (2002) (observing the dark nature of 
rules of origin is often “hidden by a facade of technical and seemingly innocuous details”). 
22 JAGDISH BHAGWATI, A STREAM OF WINDOWS: UNSETTLING REFLECTIONS ON TRADE, IMMIGRATION AND 
DEMOCRACY 290 (1998). 
23 CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 1, at 77, 86-87. 
24 See Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 763, 784-86 
(2004) [hereinafter Cho, Remedies]. 
25 Id., at 781-84. 
26 See José E. Alvarez, How Not To Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime, 7 
WIDENER L SYMP J 1, 6 (2001). 
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treaties have not even been ratified.27 Even if they are ratified, “reservations,” which are 
nothing but privatized contracting-out from those integral obligations, abound.28  
 
Pauwelyn offers a practical solution to norm conflict between WTO norms and non-WTO 
norms via inter se modifications under two requirements, which are (i) “they are not 
explicitly prohibited in the WTO treaty” and (ii) “they do not affect the rights of other 
WTO members.”29 Although these requirements appear fair and plausible at first glance, 
a closer examination soon reveals that they are nearly impossible to be met. First, those 
modifications are by definition “deviations” from the WTO obligations, such as GATT 
Articles III (National Treatment) and XI (Prohibition of Trade Restriction), and therefore 
are “explicitly prohibited,” unless they are justified. If those modifications are ever 
exempted under GATT Article XX, they are neither deviations nor explicitly prohibited, 
hence no conflict to be resolved at all.30 Therefore, the first requirement can never be 
met. Second, in this highly interdependent world, any inter se modification is likely to 
affect third parties, one way or another. Consider the following example. Suppose that the 
U.S. and Mexico signs a bilateral treaty which penalizes low labor standards through an 
import ban. If this bilateral treaty is an inter se modification, the U.S. can halt the imports 
of Mexican toys when they are allegedly manufactured in a condition where a right to 
strike is not fully protected. Yet, what if these toys are actually produced in a Mexican 
factory built by Korean investors? Wouldn’t such modification affect rights of other 
WTO member like Korea? One must notice that globalization is testimonial to a 
“collective” nature of WTO rights and obligations.  
 
Pauwelyn believes that making the WTO system porous via these inter se modifications 
is a logical step to reject the “self-contained” regime. Yet, this is a mischaracterization of 
what an open system could or should be. That the WTO is an open system does not 
necessarily mean that non-WTO norms should trump WTO norms through such 
mechanism as modifications. Borrowing Pauwelyn’s own analysis, “fall-back,” i.e., 
interpretive references to non-WTO norms, also contributes to an openness of the WTO 
system31 without necessarily relying on modifications. Unlike what Pauwelyn criticizes, 
Gabrielle Marceau is right when she argues that “WTO obligations are always the same 
for all Members” to the extent that such position does not tolerate any bilateral 
modifications of WTO rights and obligations.32 
 
Pauwelyn also overlooks negative potentials that his conflict rules may cause to the WTO 
system. First, under certain circumstances, WTO’s subordination to HR or IE in the name 
of conflict resolution may motivate, or be motivated from, “disguised” form of 
                                                 
27 See Even the U.S. has ratified only five out of thirteen basic human right treaties. See Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Treaty Data Base, Status by Country: Unites States, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet. 
28 See Martha Minnow, What is the Greatest Evil?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2134, 2156-57 (reviewing MICHAEL 
IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2004)). 
29 CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 1, at 316. 
30 Id., at 162-63, 185 (“Conflict arises only when the question of whether the two norms are in a ‘rule-
exception’ relationship is not explicitly regulated in either norm.”). 
31 Id., at 201. 
32 Id., at 316. 
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discrimination. Domestic industries often capitalize on moralistic streaks that HR or IE 
may symbolize in an attempt to justify sheer protectionism. Under these circumstances, 
conflict rules, as Pauwelyn posits, may open the Pandora ’s Box. Second, higher 
regulatory standards are largely infeasible to poor nations for their technical and financial 
shortage. It is rather nonsensical to restrict their imports and hamper their development 
through applying non-WTO norms in such areas as human health and safety. One might 
be inclined to exempt these poor countries from such regulatory burden. Then, could the 
conflict rule still achieve what it aims? What if rich countries who are bound by certain 
HR or IE via modifications build a factory in one of those poor countries, manufacture 
products, and export them to another rich country as the poor country’s origin? Third, 
even if the WTO yields to non-trade norms, its tribunal (a panel or the Appellate Body) 
should “investigate” facts and evidences before it “applies” these non-WTO norms to the 
WTO case in question. Could and should the WTO tribunal agonize over those intensive 
factual questions such as a violation of a right to strike or exhaustion of CO2 emission 
limit in specific cases? Lastly, but not least, disputes involving HR or IE can often be 
politically combustible and turn into the so-called “wrong cases,”33 in which situation 




III. Toward an Identity Formation of the WTO 
 
Pauwelyn’s definition of conflict, as is employed in his treatise, captures a close 
encounter by the WTO with non-WTO norms. In fact, he begins his book with the 
following question: 
 
How should a WTO panel react when faced with the argument that an allegedly 
WTO inconsistent trade restriction is justified under an environmental treaty, IMF 
rules or customary international law? 
 
In other words, this encounter is at the heart of his treaties and he characterizes it as 
“conflict.” To define a situation as a conflict is naturally followed by the next step of 
“resolving” such conflict via conflict rules, which are not WTO norms themselves but 
other rules under PIL. Under these conflict rules of his own prescription, various non-
WTO norms may penetrate into and prevail over WTO norms. Then, the WTO’s identity 
as a “trade” organization might be confused, diffused and finally lost.34  
 
The foregoing apprehension does not endorse the thesis that the WTO is a self-contained 
regime. The WTO, of course, must be open and communicate with other legal terrains, if 
                                                 
33 See Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 159 (1980). See also William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM 
INT'L L.J. 51, 67- 78 (1987); John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in 
GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747, 779-80 (1978) (introducing a similar concept of “big cases”). 
34 In this essay, I use certain concepts in developmental psychology, such as ”identity diffusion” and 
“identity formation,” which were largely developed by Erik Erikson, only in a metaphorical sense. See 
Susan Harter, Self and Identity Development, in S. SHIRLEY FELDMAN & GLEN R. ELLIOTT, AT THE 
THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 375-79 (1990). 
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it remains a viable organization. No system is an island, and it is especially so in this 
highly integrated and interdependent world that we live in (globalization) as well as the 
very subject-matter before us (international trade). Nonetheless, while the WTO interacts 
with, responds to, and is even influenced by its legal environment to remain open and 
linked, it must maintain its autonomy or “autopoietic” status by upholding its legal 
integrity or “operative closure.”35 In other words, those human rights law or international 
environmental law could and should not become the law of WTO per se, although we all 
acknowledge their paramount values. These non-trade values could and should only be 
addressed by the WTO itself through “altering” its own internal legal and institutional 
choices in the course of its evolution.36 What is inconsistent with the WTO rules cannot 
be WTO-legal through any devices such as inter se modifications.  
 
Critically, however, if we re-characterize Pauwelyn’s broad notion of conflict as 
“linkage” between WTO and non-WTO values, which has thus far captured a good deal 
of scholarly attention,37 the WTO can still remain open and connected to its environment. 
By reaching out to non-WTO values such as the protection of the environment or human 
health, the linkage narratives can cope with the reconciliation between trade and non-
trade values from the WTO’s standpoint, not from the PIL’s, thereby preserving the 
WTO’s autonomy, and most importantly, its “identity.  
 
The WTO’s identity has been formed and transformed since its past life, i.e., the GATT 
1947. As a post-war rehabilitation plan for international economic order, the GATT was 
understandably obsessed with trade liberalization, in particular tariff reduction, to prevent 
the recurrence of prewar economic balkanization.38 Thus, the GATT was originally 
designed as a multi-party contract for reciprocal tariff reduction. In earlier days, legal 
obligations were a mere tool for preserving a balance of concessions (give-and-takes) in 
tariff negotiations.39 Yet, a half-century evolution of the GATT, both jurisprudential and 
institutional, transformed this provisional contract into a full-blown legal system, i.e., the 
WTO. The very telos of the WTO, such as “sustainable development” and/or an 
“integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system,” in fact connotes the 
linkage theme. If the WTO remains closed and disconnected from other (non-trade) 
values and concerns, its existence would be unsustainable and thus threatened.  
 
This identity-defining transformation of telos in the history of GATT/WTO has left its 
mark in the WTO’s jurisprudence or interpretative practice. In fact, the broad scope of 
conflict which Pauwelyn adopts can eventually be solved by interpretation. Treaty 
interpretation is a serious enterprise transcending mere clarification of lexicographical 
meanings of treaty provisions. Although Pauwelyn himself recognizes interpretation as a 
conflict-avoidance tool, he maintains a rather narrow version of interpretation tantamount 
                                                 
35 Richard Nobles & David Schiff, Introduction, in NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 8 
(Fatima Kastner et al. eds 2004). 
36 Id. 
37 See Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 
5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 625, 627 (2005) [hereinafter Cho, Linkage]. 
38 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
39 Cho, Remedies, supra note 24, at 766-67. 
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to strict textualism.40 According to him, this narrow interpretation may avoid apparent 
conflicts, but still cannot resolve genuine conflicts whose solution requires other 
disciplines of international law such as the law of treaties and state responsibilities. 
However, interpretation often involves a “teleological” undertaking that invokes the 
objective and purpose (telos) of a given legal system. The teleological interpretation 
breathes a new life into often ambiguous and ambivalent treaty provisions, which are by 
and large a product of compromise at the time of negotiation.41 If we appreciate this 
teleological interpretation, the titular conflict situations, be they a conflict between WTO 
norms or a conflict between WTO norms and non-WTO norms, can be addressed without 
recourse to separate conflict disciplines. In other words, in accordance with the telos of 
the WTO a panel or the Appellate Body will eventually interpret away any alleged 
conflict situations that may arise in the WTO disputes.  
 
Certainly, the old hermeneutics under the old GATT is strikingly different from the new 
one under the WTO in dealing with the linkage issues, i.e., reconciliation between trade 
and non-trade values. Grounded on a pro-trade bias, the old GATT panels often 
downplayed domestic regulatory (non-trade) concerns. For instance, in Thai Cigarette 
(1990) a WTO panel struck down the Thai government’s ban on foreign tobaccos as a 
violation of GATT Article XI which generally prohibits any type of border measures 
restricting trade. Under GATT Article XX defense, Thai government highlighted 
Thailand’s unique situation as a developing country which would confront grave public 
health concern once it allowed unchecked flux of foreign cigarettes produced by big 
multinational tobacco companies.42 Yet, the panel rejected this defense and ruled that 
Thailand should have sought the “least trade-restrictive” means instead of the import ban 
to be qualified for being “necessary” to protect human health under GATT Article XX, 
Paragraph (b).43 Under this biased hermeneutics, the GATT could not fully address non-
trade values such as public health. The Thai Cigarette panel even ignored expert opinions 
by the authority in this field, i.e., the World Health Organization (WHO).44 
 
However, under the new WTO the Appellate Body has more sensitized non-trade values 
by providing ample maneuvering leeway to regulating governments pursuing these 
values. In paradigmatic cases such as Gasoline (1996)45 and Shrimp-Turtle (1998),46 the 
Appellate Body, under GATT Article XX, gave domestic regulators broad deference in 
                                                 
40 CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 1, at i244-45 (“Interpretation must be limited to giving meaning to rules 
of law.”). 
41 Cf. John H. Jackson, International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 8 
(2000) (viewing that “treaties are often an awkward albeit necessary method of designing institutions 
needed in today’s interdependent world, but they do not solve many problems.”). 
42 GATT, Report of the Panel, Thailand--Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes 
PP 52-53, 55-56, GATT BISD DS10/R-37S/200 (Nov 7, 1990).  
43 Id. Regarding the criticism of this panel report, see David P. Fidler, Neither Science Nor Shamans: 
Globalization of Markets and Health in the Developing World, 7 IND. J GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 191, 200-
01 (1999). 
44 Cho, Linkage, supra note 37, at 673. 
45 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States--Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WTO Doc No WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr 29, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline]. 
46 WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, United States--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WTO Doc No WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle]. 
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establishing the content of regulations, while it focused on the manner as to how they 
were applied.47 In these cases, the Appellate Body no longer second-guessed the 
foundation of domestic regulations unlike Thai Cigarette (1990). Such hermeneutical 
turn tends to advance the WTO’s openness by allowing governments to freely choose 
policy tools in achieving non-trade values through domestic measures or even non-trade 
treaties.  
 
The Shrimp-Turtle (1998) is a case in point. In this case, the Appellate Body approved 
the legitimacy of the U.S. environmental measure (Section 609) to protect the endangered 
species, i.e., sea turtle, under GATT Article XX, Paragraph (g). The complainants 
claimed that sea turtles are not “exhaustible natural resources” under this paragraph 
which was originally concerned “finite resources such as minerals, rather than biological 
or renewable resources.”48 Noting that this paragraph was drafted fifty years ago, the 
Appellate Body emphasized that its interpretation should reflect the “contemporary” 
environmental concern, such as the protection of sea turtles.49 The Appellate Body based 
its “evolutionary” approach on the new telos of the WTO, i.e., “sustainable 
development.”50 Markedly, in supporting its reasoning the Appellate Body referenced 
non-trade (environmental) conventions, such as the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) as well as related International Court of Justice 
decisions, such as Namibia (1971) and Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (1978).51 In sum, 
the Appellate Body acknowledged and endorsed the non-trade value of environmental 
protection in interpreting trade rules.  
 
In contrast, the Appellate Body concentrates its interpretive energy on the manner in 
which the regulating government executes measures of its own choice.52 This is an 
important “constitutional” methodology under which a centripetal force of free trade 
(trade value) is harmonized with a centrifugal force of regulatory autonomy (non-trade 
value) toward a legal, institutional equilibrium. It is the same interpretive technique 
which is witnessed in other polities, including the U.S.53 Interestingly, a legal basis of this 
manner-oriented interpretation is nothing but “general principles of law,” such as good 
faith, fairness, and consistency. These general principles of law function as a fulcrum 
according to which non-trade values can be balanced with trade values in the WTO 
system. Moreover, to the extent that these principles are shared by other branches of PIL, 
                                                 
47 Id., paras. 146-86 (regarding the so-called “chapeau test”). See SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND 
SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 45-62 (2003); Cho, Linkage, 
supra note 37, at 652-53. 
48 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 46, para. 127. 
49 Id., para. 129. 
50 Id. 
51 Id., paras. 130, 132. 
52 See supra text accompanying note 47. 
53 “In the newer cases what is regulated is less important than how it is regulated. The practical operation of 
a regulatory scheme is more important than whether it affects intrastate or interstate commerce directly or 
incidentally.” (emphasis original). Donald P. Kommers & Michel Waelbroeck, Legal Integration and the 
Free Movement of Goods: The American and European Experience, in FORCES AND POTENTIAL FOR A 
EUROPEAN IDENTITY (BOOK 3), METHODS, TOOLS AND INSTITUTIONS (VOLUME 1), INTEGRATION THROUGH 
LAW: EUROPEAN AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 174 (Mauro Cappelletti et al eds. 1985). 
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the WTO norms are communicable with non-WTO norms, and thus remain open to and 
coherent with its legal environment.  
 
The case for the WTO’s identity formation, not identity diffusion, in its interaction with 
non-WTO norms goes beyond the foregoing hermeneutical dimension and stretches to an 
“institutional” domain. Simply, no narratives, and thus no nomos,54 corresponding to 
human rights and international environment exist within the WTO which might have 
justified a direct normative control of the WTO by non-WTO norms. The GATT/WTO 
acquis, comprising not only jurisprudence but also other rich institutional memory, does 
not truly connote and denote particularities of human rights or international 
environmental law. This is one of the main reasons why WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body may treat non-WTO norms and their performance/operation in other terrain of 
international law as “facts”55 which may base their legal reasoning, but not as directly 
applicable and binding “norms” per se. To wit, non-WTO norms could be supplemental 
or complementary, yet not supplant to WTO norms. Certainly, this institutional 
deficiency within the WTO vis-à-vis non-WTO norms can be addressed by engaging in a 
cross-institutional dialogue with other international organizations in the form of 
committees (e.g., the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment), agreements (e.g., 
WTO-IMF Cooperation Agreement), or harmonization (e.g., Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 3). Admittedly, these 





Pauwelyn’s book deserves many credits for its unique value and contributions. It touches 
on an important subject-matter in the area of public international law. Undoubtedly, it is a 
laudable attempt to define conflict of norms in public international law, especially 
between WTO norms and non-WTO norms, in times of globalization and growing 
interdependence. The book is a product of serious enterprise both in its inclusiveness and 
profundity. It is very well-researched and rich in citations of jurisprudence and literatures. 
 
It is not my intention to trivialize possible, and even desirable, nutritional inputs or 
contributions from non-WTO norms to WTO norms which can provide opportunities for 
cross-fertilization and help better reconcile between trade and regulatory goals. Yet, such 
cross-fertilization or reconciliation should be the WTO’s call. No other treaties should 
replace the WTO in that call. After all, it is all about “trade and environment (human 
rights),” not “environment (human rights) and trade.”   
 
In the absence of an Austinian World Government, horizontal conflict of norms between 
the WTO and other branches of PIL may be inevitable. Pauwelyn’s solution for such 
conflict leans toward PIL as long as he is willing to sacrifice the autonomy of the WTO 
                                                 
54 Cf. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
55 CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 1, at 463-64. 
56 Id., at 7. 
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system to outsource PIL.57 However, WTO norms exist on its own just as HR and IE 
claim their own legal distinctiveness. While Pauwelyn’s thesis of conflict resolution 
might turn the WTO porous beyond his wildest dream, at the same time it certainly risks 
weakening the WTO system through osteoporosis and thus encroaching upon the WTO’s 
identity.  
 
                                                 
57 “The effect of the approach suggested here, that WTO rules would apply differently to different WTO 
members depending on whether or not they have accepted other non-WTO rules, may complicate the 
matrix of rights and obligations between WTO members.” Id., at 476. 
